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This essay provides a novel account of epistemic injustice by changing the standpoint of analysis from
the marginalised to the oppressor. Previous investigations into epistemic injustice have shown how mem-
bers of a marginalised group are harmed as knowers through their own speech. The framework that I will
build — incorporating core elements of Fricker and Dotson’s work — focuses on speakers who truncate
their own speech in conversation with a member of a marginalised social group, due to a bias against
said audience. Testimonial throttling, at its core, is a restriction of access to the pool of knowledge due to
bias. While a complete exposition of Fricker and Dotson’s work falls outwith the bounds of this essay, their
accounts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘testimonial quieting’, respectively, are instrumental in my account
of ‘testimonial throttling’. After describing the foundations of this new account of epistemic injustice, I
will propose a set of conditions along with thought experiment that describes a specific instance of tes-
timonial throttling. Having defined testimonial throttling, I show that it covers a gap in the literature and
provides insight into a vast array of resultant epistemic and practical harms. Before concluding I discuss
a possible recourse for both the speaker and audience to combat testimonial throttling itself.
1 The Speaker: Why, and How
1.1 Why Investigate Testimonial Throttling?
1.1.1 The Road so Far: Fricker and Dotson
Fricker explains epistemic injustice by providing an account of testimonial injustice.
This builds upon the concept of speaker credibility, which is the level of belief we have in
the credibility of the person speaking. When a speaker has their credibility deated they
can in turn be “wronged specically in her capacity as a knower”1 — this is testimonial
injustice. Specically, the credibility decit must be the result of bias, rather than due to
the content of the speech, for it to constitute testimonial injustice.2 Fricker uses Harper
Lee’s ‘To Kill aMockingbird’ to illustrate her denition. TomRobinson, is unable to testify
(both epistemically and legally) to the actions that resulted in his indictment — if he is to
state that the white girl tried to kiss him, he will not be believed as a blackman in a racist
society.
1Fricker, Miranda, ‘Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing’, (2007), OUP, 20.
2Fricker, 22.
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Fricker’s other account of epistemic injustice, the more complex hermeneutical
injustice, will help us clarify the nature of epistemic injustice. Fricker uses the example
of women not having a term for sexual harassment as a paradigmatic case of hermeneu-
tical injustice. Due to exclusion from the elds that investigate and construct concepts,
and thus language, “such as journalism, politics, academia, and law”,3 women faced an
obstacle that was not yet dened and to which they could not properly articulate an ob-
jection.
Fricker ties these two types of epistemic injustice to exemplify the nature of epis-
temic injustice clearly: “Thewrongs involved in the two sorts of epistemic injustice, then,
have a common epistemic signicance running through them— prejudicial exclusion from
participation in the spread of knowledge”.4 Epistemic injustice happens when people are
excluded from the ’pooling of knowledge’ (i.e. the knowledge we all share, contribute
to, and draw from), due to bias. Testimonial injustice happens when this exclusion is
based on "identity prejudice on the part of the hearer".5 Hermeneutical injustice is when
this exclusion is based on "structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical
resource”.6
Dotson expands the discourse by dening ‘epistemic violence’. She claries the
importance of the audience on the “success of a speaker’s attempt to communicate”;7
when the audience denies a speaker their full capacity to ‘hear’ they commit epistemic
violence. This hinges on Dotson’s denitions of ‘reliable ignorance’ and ‘pernicious ig-
norance’. Pernicious ignorance is an extension of reliable ignorance (“ignorance that is
consistent or follows from a predictable epistemic gap in cognitive resources”8) wherein
the social context means that the reliable ignorance “causes or contributes to a harmful
practice”.9
Tobetter understandwhatmakespernicious ignorance anepistemic violenceDot-
son provides an account of ‘testimonial quieting’, which occurswhen “an audience fails to
identify a speaker as a knower.”10 Thebroadnature of this concept is illustrated inDotson’s
example: the epistemic position of black women in America. “Black women as belonging
to an objectied social group, which hinders them from being perceived as knowers”,11
such consistent lack of recognition for blackwomen’s capacity as knowers exemplies re-
liable ignorance. Moreover, given the obvious repercussions for such a belief, it is clearly
a case of pernicious ignorance as well.
The other form that epistemic violence takes, as Dotson denes it, is through
‘testimonial smothering’, which occurs when a “speaker perceives one’s immediate au-
dience as unwilling or unable to gain the appropriate uptake of proered testimony.”12
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mony: (a) “the content of the testimony must be unsafe and risky”; (b) “the audience
must demonstrate testimonial incompetence with respect to the content of the testimony
to the speaker”; and (c) ”testimonial incompetence must follow from, or appear to follow
from, pernicious ignorance”.13 Dotson gives the example of discussion of domestic vio-
lence against black women “understood to corroborate stereotypes concerning the imag-
ined “violent” black male”14. As epistemic violence occurs in “a failure of an audience
to communicatively reciprocate, either intentionally or unintentionally”, the ‘violence’ of
testimonial smothering is the audience’s failure to demonstrate testimonial competence
due to their pernicious ignorance.
Having seen the development and implementation of the terms ‘epistemic vio-
lence’ and ‘epistemic injustice’ — they are epistemic as they relate to knowledge and are
linked by the harms they cause — we now have our framework for building an expan-
sion of the eld. ‘Testimonial throttling’, as I will dene it, develops from both of these
epistemological investigations.
1.1.2 Why Must We Investigate Bias-induced Speaker Truncation?
(i) The lack of investigation into the common instance of biased speakers truncating their
speech; (ii) The necessary importance of investigating those who control access to infor-
mation.
(i)Dotson’s work on ‘testimonial smothering’ relies on the analysis of speech trun-
cation in instances wherein the speaker perceives bias against themselves. In Fricker’s
testimonial injustice, the injustice occurs when a speaker has deated credibility due to
bias. A gap exists between these two: when the speaker is biased against their audience
and thus truncates their testimony. Such an occurrence is ubiquitous in societies rifewith
identity prejudice, that is to say all societies.
(ii) The oppressor has the greatest propensity to commit epistemic injustice; they
are able to restrict access to knowledge as they, by denition, hold power. Moreover, there
is a motive for the oppressor to suppress access to knowledge in order to continue their
literal and epistemic subjugation of the marginalised groups they oppress. This comes to
fruition as a ‘self-fullling prophecy’ which will be discussed at length in Section 2.2.
1.1.3 Objections to the Investigation
Feminist epistemology takes the standpoint of the oppressed. While it may seem that
analysing the speechof thepowerful (as testimonial throttling sets out to) goes against this
shared methodological aim, this is not the case. While it is true that “feminist standpoint
theorists have been explaining the importance of starting our thinking or our research
from the lives of marginalized people”15, investigating the powerful can shed much light
13Dotson, 244.
14Dotson, 245.
15Garry, Ann, ‘Intersectionality, Metaphors, and the Multiplicity of Gender’, Hypatia, 26, no. 4 (2011), 828.
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on the epistemic injustices that marginalised people face.
Throughout this paper I will refer to the ‘marginalised’ or ‘oppressed’; and the
‘oppressor’. I understand that these terms have their denitions debated to great extent
in the literature; later work on testimonial throttling could include reference to specic
theories of oppression but I feel it falls outside the bounds of this work. Thus, I use them
and intend them to be understood in simple, relational terms.
1.1.4 Throttling’s Advantage and the Term Itself
While it is primarily a complementary theory: there are inherent advantages to testimo-
nial throttling as a mode of analysis over Fricker and Dotson’s work. While the harms
resulting from testimonial throttling serve to best elucidate its importance, I posit that
methodologically, throttling is easier to diagnose.
Throttling is easier to spot in social contexts, both historically and in new in-
stances. As an outside observer, in order to diagnose an instance of testimonial throt-
tling, we merely have to see a dierence in speech due to bias on the part of the speaker.
In the case of testimonial smothering, a further demand is that wemust conclude that the
speaker is changing their speech due to (a) her perception of (b) the audience’s potential for
bias against her group. This calculation on the part of the speaker necessitates a subjec-
tive analysis that is not present in the cut and dry case of testimonial throttling. Given our
goal should be to end epistemic injustices, the simplicity of testimonial throttling makes
it easier to propose solutions to it.
I would like tomake a note on the term ‘throttling’. While it evokes violence, I nd
this necessary, much as Dotson uses smothering, given the injustice at play. I intend its
use not only as an homage to Dotson but as a double meaning - with ‘throttle’ understood
to denote:
control, the throttle of a car, controllingpower output just as testimonial throttling
controls knowledge output; and abuse with throttling as a physical act of violence that
controls the subject, just as limiting access to thepool of knowledge abuses themarginalised.
1.2 Defining Throttling
1.2.1 The Conditions
Testimonial throttling occurs when:
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(1) Speaker ‘P’ truncates speech to an audience ‘Q’.
(1.a) Qmust be the marginalised member of the conversation in which
the truncation takes place.
(1.a.i) Q’s status as ‘marginalised’ is relational to P, it can be
but need not be that they are structurally oppressed.
(1.a.ii) P has knowledge that Q lacks, while theymay not nec-
essarily oppress themarginalised elsewhere, situation-
ally they hold power over the knowledge.
(2) The truncation reduces Q’s access to the pool of knowledge.
(2.a) This knowledge would benet Q and is relevant to the conversa-
tion.
(3) P’s reason for the truncation is bias against Q.
(3.a) Specically, bias results from identity prejudice.
(3.a.i) Thus, Q’s status as a knower is devalued.
(4) Q is harmed as a knower due to the conjunction of (1), (2), & (3).
Specically:
• While it is likely that themarginalised audience is structurally oppressedgiven
the nature of such knowledge exchanges, it should not be a necessary condi-
tion for testimonial throttling. This allows for cases wherein ‘outliers’ of op-
pressed groups nd themselves in positions of power over knowledge but con-
tinue to act as an oppressive force to others, even to their own communities.16
However, the central case of testimonial throttling should be understood as
that which represents the structural disadvantage of the access to knowledge
of the marginalised.
• In 3.a.i. Q’s status as a knower being devalued mirrors Fricker’s speaker credi-
bility in cases of testimonial injustice. Just like TomRobinson’s credibility was
deated and so he wasn’t believed a competent witness, Q is considered an
incompetent audience.
1.3 Testimonial Throttling in Action
1.3.1 A Thought Experiment
This case not only shows a common and clearly diagnosable example of testimonial throt-
tling but will also serve as a solid basis for analysing the epistemic and practical harms
that arise from instances of testimonial throttling.
16A black republican senator, for example, is a member of a marginalised group still capable of testimonial throttling against mi-
nority communities in his capacity as a senator.
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We are to imagine that a white man goes to a job centre, where he is given ample
resources on emerging industries he may be suited to and instruction on the best way to
prepare for a job interview. He follows the advice and secures a good job in a relevant
industry.
A black woman with the same qualications and background goes to the same
job centre and meets with the same person. However, due to their preconceived bias
that black women are ‘lazy’ and ‘stupid’, the job centre employee believes that the black
womanwould not benet from the information he is able to provide her. Thus, he doesn’t
bother to explain the current industrial dynamics, nor does he give any advice on securing
such a job,merely handing the blackwoman some readily-available pamphlets and giving
non-specic advice. The black woman leaves the job centre with little new or relevant
information.
1.3.2 Applying our Conditions
We set out conditions for testimonial throttling in section 1.2.1. I will now use the thought
experiment to elucidate these conditions.
In this case, the employee takes the place of ‘P’, and the black woman ‘Q’.
(1) P has clearly truncated their speech directed at an audience Q, the speech
granted to the white man before Q shows the extent of this truncation.
(1.a) Q is marginalised and relies on P for access to the pool of knowl-
edge, due to her position as job seeker.
(1.a.i) In this case Q is also a member of a structurally op-
pressed group, black women, who have been system-
atically discriminated against in the job market.
(1.a.ii) P has knowledge due to their position as a job centre
employee that Q lacks.
(2) The truncation reduces Q’s access to the pool of knowledge that would allow
her to advance her job seeking ambitions.
(2.a) The truncated part of the speech contains knowledge highly im-
portant and relevant to the job seeking, i.e. the reason for the con-
versation.
(3) P’s reason for the truncation is bias against Q.
(3.a) Specically, bias results from P’s racial bias: identity prejudice.
(3.a.i) Thus, Q has her status as a knower devalued by P not
due to any substantive reason
(4) Q is harmed as a knower due to the conjunction of (1), (2), & (3).
14 ’Testimonial Throttling’ and Epistemic Injustice
1.3.3 Truncations of Speech Without Testimonial Throttling
It is important for a precise account of testimonial throttling to consider cases that ap-
pear to be truncations of speech, perhaps even due to bias, that do not meet the entire
criteria. Tight criteria and acknowledgement of possible problem cases should bulwark
testimonial throttling against possible objections.
Case 1 -When truncating testimony is not an epistemic harm & not due to bias.
In this case someone is truncating speech for epistemically benecial reasons. A
public lecture on a scientic discovery that is attempting to inform non-specialists will
use dierent language to a professor informing his students of the same subject. The
speech truncation in this case is not done either to cause harm, nor is it epistemically
harmful - it is done to aid understanding of a topic that can be easily understood to be
outside the grasp of the general public. In this case, simplication of technical terminol-
ogy aids access to the pool of knowledge.
Case 2 -When truncating testimony is hurtful & due to bias but not an epistemic
harm.
In this case we see a truncation of speech, due to bias, that may cause emotional
harm to the audience but cannot qualify as an epistemic harm. For example, an employer
in the service industrymay truncate their speechwhen speaking to an employee they pre-
sume unable to understand ‘proper english’. In saying something like “Clean. . . toilet. . .
now” rather than “once you’re done with your current task please can you go on to clean
the toilets”, the employermight hurt their audience’s feelings and are acting on their bias
but clearly there is no epistemic injustice at play. While speech has been truncated, the
part that has been removed is not contributory to the pool of knowledge and while the
worker may feel demeaned they have not been harmed in their capacity as a knower.
2 What’s Happening to the Audience: Epistemic
and Practical Harms
2.1 Epistemic Ramifications of Throttling
2.1.1 How Epistemic Injustices are ’Epistemic:’
Pohlhaus Jr. provides a useful set of criteria that describes the epistemological nature of
the injustices present in the literature. I will rst describe the criteria as they relate to
Fricker and Dotson’s work and then how each similarly applies to ‘testimonial throttling’.
Pohlhaus Jr. helpfully uses both Fricker and Dotson to relay the main epistemo-
logical signicance of epistemic injustice: that the injustice is being done to “knowers
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as knowers.”17 She describes how in Dotson’s case it is a knower’s testimony that is sup-
pressed (testimony is uncontroversially understood to be of great epistemic signicance)
and Fricker’s that it is made “dicult for particular knowers to know what it is in their
interest to know”.18 Similarly, ‘testimonial throttling’ is the action of suppressing one’s
access to the pool of knowledge, thus it wrongs the audience specically in their capacity
as knowers.
Furthermore, Pohlhaus Jr. describes these injustices as epistemic due to their in-
ducing epistemic dysfunction,19 that which (negatively) aects one’s status or ability as an
epistemic agent. The resultant harms of epistemic dysfunction, “distorting understand-
ing and stymieing inquiry”20 , are clearly present in cases of testimonial throttling. The
audience’s understanding is distorted as they are unaware of the knowledge they lack.
Similarly, their ability to inquire is reduced by the lack of access to the full pool of knowl-
edge. Thus, ‘testimonial throttling’ meets Pohlhaus Jr.’s second criterion as an action that
causes ‘epistemic dysfunction’.
The third criterion is an extension of the rst two in that it states such harms
arise either “within [... or ...] through the use of, our epistemic practices and institu-
tions”.21 Epistemic practices are all those which engage with the social pool of knowl-
edge; Pohlhaus Jr. notes that ‘school curricula’ is an epistemic institution. If curricula
are a locus of epistemic injustice then the application of a curriculum can surely produce
instances of testimonial throttling. Given testimonial throttling’s focus on speech trunca-
tion that aects access to the pool of knowledge it aids our evaluation of the harms “an
epistemic institution causes in its capacity as an epistemic institution.”22
2.1.2 Epistemic Objectification
There is a debate in the literature as to whether the primary harm that occurs in cases of
testimonial injustice is an instance of ‘epistemic objectication’ or ‘epistemic othering’.
An understanding of this debate will help frame ‘testimonial throttling’ in the literature
whilst serving to better understand the exact nature of the resultant epistemic harms.
Fricker posits that theharm objecties, as the epistemic agent is treated as anobject
or “a mere source of information rather than as an informant due to one’s prejudices”.23
This is based upon a criteria of objectication, proposed by Nussbaum, that identies
sevenways in which onemay be objectied.24 Fricker specically focuses onNussbaum’s
third criterion ‘inertness’, that states “the objectier treats the object as lacking in agency,
and perhaps also in activity”.Nussbaum, 257






23McGlynn, Ann, ‘Objects or Others? Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice’, Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice 23 (2020), 832.
24"Instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility, violability, ownership, and the denial of subjectivity". from: Nuss-
baum, Martha, ‘Objectication’, Philosophy and Public Aairs 24, no. 4 (1995), 257.
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McGlynn notes that three problem cases are typically used to motivate the claim
that the harm should instead be considered an instance of epistemic othering:
(i) When there is a failure to consider the speaker as an inquirer despite treating
them as an informant rather than a mere source of information.25
(ii) When credibility excess leads to a testimonial injustice.26
(iii) When one lies in spite of being considered capable of telling the truth.27
I adopt McGlynn’s approach to these problem cases. In order to solve these prob-
lem cases and account for testimonial throttling within the framework of epistemic ob-
jectication we need only turn to the rest of Nussbaum’s criteria. McGlynn refers to the
specic implementation of each of Nussbaum’s criteria in the epistemic objectication
account of harm as ‘epistemic analogues’.28
McGlynn argues that (ii) can be solved by considering Nussbaum’s “Fungibility”
criterion, wherein “the objectier treats the object as interchangeable with other objects
of the same type, or with objects of other types”29. Similarly, (i) can be overcome when
one considers it an example of Nussbaum’s second criterion: a ‘denial of autonomy’ in
which “the objectier treats the object as lacking in autonomy and self determination”30.
Finally, (iii) is actually not a problem case. Fricker deals with this in her example of Tom
Robinson’s testimony as he is believed to have been insincere: she considers “both com-
petence and sincerity as epistemic [...] she takes the capacity to convey one’s knowledge
to others as essential to the very possession of knowledge”.31
Having asserted the applicability of the objectifying account of epistemic harm in
Fricker’s ‘testimonial injustice’, its use for describing the harms inherent to testimonial
throttling is clear. When a speaker truncates their speech due to bias they are, in fact,
epistemically objectifying their audience in accordance with four of Nussbaum’s criteria
for objectication, specically through the analogues of: (a) “inertness: the objectier
treats the object as lacking in agency, and perhaps also in activity.”32; (b) “denial of sub-
jectivity: the objectier treats the object as something whose experiences and feelings
(if any) need not be taken into account.”33; as well as the aforementioned (c) ‘denial of
autonomy’ and (d) ‘fungibility’.
2.1.3 Applicability of Objectification to Throttling
To illustrate my case I will show how each of these are observable in cases of testimonial







31Hawley, Katherine, ’Trust, Distrust, and Epistemic Injustice’ in: The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice (2017), 72.
32Nussbaum, 257.
33Nussbaum, 257.
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bility of each mode of objectication:
(a) The classic means of objectication in Fricker’s cases is treating the agent as
inert. In our case we see the audience being treated as inert through the as-
sumptionsmade on the part of the speaker. By allowing their bias to inuence
their speech truncation they take no measures to engage with the audience
as an epistemic agent and thus are treating them as though they lack agency.
They see a ‘black woman’ and their minds are made up (due to their bias) as
to their audience’s capacity.
(b) Theaudience arehaving their subjectivity denied as they are judgedand treated
not due to their individual experiences or feelings but instead solely as a rep-
resentative of their group; conversely, the white man is treated as a unique
individual whose feelings and experiences are taken into account.
(c) The speaker is clearly denying the audience their autonomy, by restricting
their access to knowledge they are denying their right to self-determination.
The restricted knowledge, on account of their membership of a marginalised
group, restricts their ability to ourish. The audience, having been dened as
‘a black woman’ and having been tarred through bias as being ‘undeserving’
of access to the full pool of knowledge, is seen as not betting the full range
of opportunity to develop themselves that would be granted to ‘a white man’.
(d) The audience being treated as ‘fungible’ can be seen as an extension of (b).
While the denial of subjectivity means that the audience is being seen solely
as ‘a blackwoman’ rather than a complex individual, they are being demeaned
by the fact that the speaker is considering them to be interchangeable with
any other member of the group ‘black women’. The white man is considered
an individual and thus given specic, relevant information; the black woman
is given the small amount of information that the employee would give any
black woman.
Thus, we have framed the primary epistemic harms of ‘testimonial throttling’,
with reference to several leading authors in the eld of feminist epistemology. Moreover,
we have used the case given in Section 1 to exemplify these harms.
2.2 Practical Harms Arising from Epistemic Harms
Having described the epistemic harms that arise from instances of testimonial throttling
I will move on to the practical implications of these harms.
2.2.1 Individual and Group Harms
Anderson claims that Fricker’s ‘testimonial injustice’ fails to remedy the structural nature
of epistemic injustice as “her remedies in both cases [individual and structural injustices]
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stress individual virtue”.34 Anderson claims Fricker’s “depict[ion] as a transactional injus-
tice”,35 cannot account for structural epistemic injustice. However, I contest that Ander-
son is merely not considering enough instances of transactional injustices. Adding more
accounts of transactional injustices (testimonial throttling being merely one), will show
that transactional injustices can account for structural injustices.
Anderson proposes a case:
there is no transactional injustice in refusing to oer a job to an unqualied ap-
plicant, the fact that members of a disadvantaged group cannot get good jobs
because they have been unjustly denied opportunities to qualify themselves for
these jobs justies the judgment that their lack of access to good jobs is a struc-
tural injustice.36
Anderson is correct that testimonial injustice alone is inadequate to account for
the asymmetry of access to the pool of knowledge; it is for this reason I consider throt-
tling a signicant expansion of the literature. The case she gives is a paradigmatic exam-
ple of the structural repercussions of an instance of testimonial throttling — as shown in
my thought experiment. Testimonial throttling is one of many ‘transactional’ instances
that can lead to structural injustices. As the literature expands, we will have accounts of
manymore varieties of transactional instances of epistemic injustice that will further our
understanding of the resultant structural injustices. Deconstructing these structural in-
justices from their point of conception (instances of transactional injustice) will provide
us with the best tools for combatting injustice.
However, Anderson is correct in noting that a full treatise on the remedies for
structural epistemic injustices “would require many books”.37 Importantly, this analysis
has shown the intrinsic link between individual and group harms: each instance of trans-
actional injustice against individuals contributes to the structural injustices the group (of
which the individuals are members) must face.
2.2.2 Personal Harms
It takes little imagination to see how the repercussions of testimonial throttling can be
severe and widespread. I see these practical harms as ways in which the audience are
harmed as persons — in contrast to them being harmed as knowers. The rst harm I will
discuss is both an epistemic and practical harm, it is perhaps the most signicant of all
the harms that an account of testimonial throttling divulges: the self-fullling prophecy.
The self-fullling prophecy can be best understood practically, through our orig-
inal thought experiment. The aermath of our thought experiment can conceivably go
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as follows. The white man’s ability to get a good job will be greatly improved via his easy
access to the pool of knowledge. The black woman will struggle to get a similar job due
to her lack of access to the same pool of knowledge. Her lack of access to the pool of
knowledge will result in her genuinely having less knowledge, thus ‘conrming’ one of
the original stereotypes that resulted in speech truncation: that black women are stupid.
Furthermore, her lack of knowledge in this area will result in her nding it more dicult
to get a job. Her resultant unemployment will ‘conrm’ to her prejudiced observers that
she is lazy, the other stereotype for which she was excluded from access to the pool of
knowledge. In summary: the result that the white man gets the job and the black woman
is forced to go onto unemployment benets, rearms both the employee’s racist beliefs
and the white man’s belief of superiority. I see this as a reection of the consequences
Fricker discussed, inwhich thosewho commit testimonial injustices end up limiting their
own access to knowledge:
So the preservation of ignorance that p, where p is the propositional content of
what was said, may oen entail further missed epistemic opportunity [...] We
might express this by saying that testimonial injustice tends to preserve not only
immediate ignorance but also inferentially ramied ignorance.38
However, in our case those that commit the injustice limit their victims’ access to
knowledge.
The self-fullling prophecy is thus, the conrmation of the original biases - that
led to testimonial throttling — by the eect testimonial throttling has on its audience.
This in turn can lead to further testimonial throttling. For instance, in our case, the black
woman going onto unemployment benets will increase the percentage of black unem-
ployment, leading the job centre employee to rearm his belief that black women are
lazy and make him even less likely to provide black women with adequate resources in
the future. The self-fullling prophecy causes harm to the audience over and over again,
as knowers and as persons.
The self-fullling prophecy is not only a symptom of oppressive society but one
of the causes, an enabler of what Mills calls the ‘domination contract’, that in contrast to
social contract theory, “society is basically coercive, with injustices and social oppression
being the norm”.40 Without properly assessing instances of testimonial throttling we per-
mit the coercive nature of society that states “United States has historically been a racially
awed liberal democracy”41 rather than the United States has historically been a white
supremacist polity.”42 Testimonial throttling addresses systemic practices that create and
reinforce oppressive dichotomies, particularly racist theories of supremacy, which harm
the audience as persons.
Beyond the self-fullling prophecy there are numerous practical harms that re-
sult from instances of testimonial throttling. The black woman is clearly harmed as a
38Fricker M., & Jenkins, K., ‘Epistemic Injustice, Ignorance, and Trans Experience’, in: 39 (2017), Routledge, 270.
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person by her lack of ability to get a job: nancially as well as her ability to achieve
self-determination. The possibilities for similar harms are endless. The black student
who was not adequately prepared for his university applications due to his teachers’ bias
misses out not only on the nancial opportunity that a degree permits but also to become
better educated. The minority defendant who through the bias of lawyers and the court
isn’t fully explained the consequences of a plea bargain and relinquishes her freedom.43
Testimonial throttling clearly accounts for harms that negatively aect the daily lives of
those on the receiving end. For this reason, testimonial throttling is a social justice issue
as much as it is an epistemic concern.
2.3 Alleviating a Meta-Harm & Ethics of this Investigation
This paper has addressed ameta concern. Wehave provided thosewho have been subject
to testimonial throttling a concept which makes their experience intelligible. Before this
investigation, those on the receiving end of testimonial throttling were unable to make
communicatively intelligible something which was particularly in their interests to be
able to render intelligible. This has the eect of ending one hermeneutical injustice. To
not discuss these concerns would be to engage in “the active production and preservation
of ignorance by those in privileged positions”.44
Pohlhaus Jr. warns, when writing on epistemic injustices: “we would do well to
consider [...] the ways in which this essay might itself participate in and perpetuate epis-
temic injustice”.45 Thus, I have tried to ensure that this essay does not engage in throttling
nor any other act of epistemic injustice. From my perspective, a privileged one where I
am not a member of a marginalised community, I have attempted to spell out my case
clearly so as to not create an impasse for any potential readers.
2.4 What Can be Done About This, by the Speaker and the
Audience.
Remedies for epistemic injustices are dicult due to the wide-reaching, structural and
individual biases that form their cause. This puts philosophers in the position that their
proposed solutions can be deemed ‘grandiose’ or ‘naïve’. However, instances of testimo-
nial throttling can be reduced on the part of the speaker, and the audience, being aware
of throttling, can prepare to ght against it.
On the speaker side, Sullivan points to a number of ways in which we can begin to
stamp out epistemic injustices in the criminal justice system. His most relevant point is,
to “increase eorts tomake judges and juriesmore aware of the assumptions they bring to
43Cox, Jane, & Sacks-Jones, Katharine, ‘Double Disadvantage: The Experiences of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Women
in the Criminal Justice System’, Agenda, the alliance for women and girls at risk’: Report (April 2017), https://weareagenda.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Double-disadvantage-FINAL.pdf, 8.
44Tuana, Nancy, ‘Feminist epistemology: the subject of knowledge’, in: The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice (2017), 132.
45Pohlhaus Jr, 14.
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their interpretation of themeaning of our social practices.”46 Themost important barrier
to stopping testimonial throttling is ignorance of the act. If, as we have shown, implicit
bias can cause testimonial throttling, then society, and individuals, must work hard to
acknowledge their own biases. Sullivan notes that: “The retraining andwide-ranging dia-
logueneeded for an assessment of the objectivity of our beliefswould require a signicant
investment of time and energy”.47 While I do not doubt the diculty of this undertaking,
in the past year alone we have seen the meteoric rise of Black Lives Matter, a movement
whose purpose is to raise awareness of structural and individual racism in society. As
racial justice movements grow, those who control access to knowledge will inevitably be
forced to consider their own role in a system that perpetuates injustice, epistemic or oth-
erwise. Thus, the clearest way of decreasing the instances of testimonial throttling is
through increasing awareness for those who perpetrate it. In Dotson’s terminology this
would be education to weed out pernicious ignorance, in Fricker’s this would be ensuring
that credibility is not unjustly deated. As Sullivan puts it “active ignorance of our own
ignorance” is no excuse.48
As for the audience, hoping that awareness of testimonial throttling will enable
those on the receiving end to prepare for it is only one small step - becoming aware that
sources of knowledge can be biased, motivates searching for knowledge elsewhere. To
contest testimonial throttling, to call it out when it is apparent, is the clearest (if tremen-
dously dicult) means of raising awareness. To ask that of the marginalised, could be
asking too much, but as we have seen with the rise of racial justice movements this cen-
tury - it can be done.
3 Conclusion
I have shown that testimonial throttling merits a place in the literature given its wide
reaching implications andubiquity. Ideally, the discernment of cases of testimonial throt-
tling should bemade a priority for thosewishing to ght for not only epistemic justice but
social justice. Eliminating instances of testimonial throttling will increase access to the
pool of knowledge, in turn preventing the ‘self-fullling prophecy’ and other resultant
harms. While these aims are no mean feat, such idealism is not without merit. Episte-
mology by its very nature can be a force for change: as knowledge builds so does power.
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